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ARTICLES
Public Opinion and the Limits of State Law: The Case for a Federal
Usury Cap
Nathalie Martin ......................................................................... ...259
Each year, states pour millions and millions of dollars of taxpayer
money into regulating high-cost credit products like payday, title,
and installment loans. These loans typically carry interest rates of
400-1,000% per annum. Most Americans are unaware that it is legal
to charge these rates in some states. Moreover, most Americans,
regardless of political affiliation, favor capping interest on consumer loans at 36% or less. While a number of states do cap interest on
all consumer loans at 36% or less, the majority does not; the majority chooses instead to leave these loans unregulated or to use another
regulatory approach. The regulatory approaches used by states have
largely failed to meet states’ goals of curbing abuses in high cost
lending. As a result, states and individuals have taken to the courts
to address abuses in high cost lending. These litigation efforts have
also proven to be highly expensive and largely ineffective methods of
curbing abuses in high cost lending. Because Americans overwhelmingly favor interest rate caps on consumer loans, and because states
have been unable to deliver them, this Article calls on Congress to
impose a federal usury cap on all consumer loans and suggests
statutory language for doing so. This solution could protect consumers who use the loans and save taxpayer money for all Americans.
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Physical and Financial Injuries: The Common Fund Doctrine and Its
Application Under the Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act
Ayla Ellison ............................................................................. ...305
Under the Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act, hospitals and
healthcare providers do not directly contribute to plaintiff attorneys’
fees in cases where they will benefit from a judgment or settlement.
Medical liens allow healthcare providers and healthcare professionals to recoup payment for services they have rendered to an injured
patient, and under the current scheme in Illinois, healthcare providers are being unjustly enriched by receiving benefits from settlements and litigation that they did not financially contribute to. The
use of the Common Fund Doctrine, with healthcare professional and
healthcare provider contribution, will prevent this unjust enrichment
from occurring.

Rethinking the Validity of State Religions:
Is Antiestablishmentarianism a Fundamental Prerequisite for the
Protection of Religious Rights Under International Human Rights Law?
Julia L. Ernst ............................................................................ ...333
State religions exist in various forms in approximately forty percent
of countries, including Denmark, Greece, and the United Kingdom.
Despite the benefits that the establishment of religion may bring to
some people, this church-state arrangement violates internationally
recognized human rights in a number of ways. Yet antiestablishmentarianism—otherwise known as the doctrine of separation of church
and state—is not currently recognized as necessary for the protection of religious rights. This Article argues that antiestablishmentarianism is a fundamental prerequisite for the protection of religious
rights under international human rights law. Following the introduction in Part I of the Article, Part II reviews examples of human
rights norms protecting religious rights embodied in international
instruments and explores how these rights are violated by state
religions. Part III considers additional concerns that are raised by
the establishment of religion. Part IV critiques pronouncements by
international human rights entities and scholars suggesting that,
while aspects of state religions have encroached upon religious
rights, state religions per se do not. Part V discusses the tentative
movement toward antiestablishmentarianism, including countries
that have recently disestablished. Part VI concludes that the international human rights community should explicitly affirm the principle
of antiestablishmentarianism as a necessary prerequisite for the
protection of religious rights within the international human rights
framework.

Between Killing and Letting Die in Criminal Jurisprudence
Dr. Roni Rosenberg .................................................................. ...391
The distinction between act and omission is deeply embedded in our
legal thinking. Criminal jurisprudence distinguishes sharply between
harmful actions and harmful omissions and, consequently, between
killing and letting die. The distinction between act and omission is
not made solely under criminal jurisprudence as it is rooted in the
foundations of common morality, which emphasizes not only the
results but also the conduct that produced those results.
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Nevertheless, since the beginning of the 1960s, there has been a
significant movement to attack and criticize the moral distinction
between killing and letting die. The primary question is whether
there is, in fact, a moral distinction between causing harm and
letting harm happen; more specifically, is there such a distinction
between killing and letting die? Furthermore, if, in fact, such a
moral distinction does exist, what is the rationale behind it?
Obviously, this is a morally radical position that demands a significant change in perspective, moral and perhaps also legal, since if
the moral distinction between act and omission is not obvious, the
legal distinction cannot be clear cut either. This lack of clarity has
led to many attempts at laying a logical foundation for the intuitive
understanding that there is a legal distinction between act and
omission, and specifically between killing and letting die; yet it
seems that creating this clear distinction is easier said than done.
This Article surveys and critiques several important theories for the
distinction between act and omission. It goes on to introduce a new
theory for this distinction; one based on the difference between the
protected values that are foundational to the prohibitions against
killing and letting die. This new perspective goes hand in hand with
the Hobbesian and Rawlsian theories of social contract and with
general theories of rule utilitarianism.

C OMMENTS
An Inconsistent Truth: The Various Establishment Clause Tests As
Applied in the Context of Public Displays of (Allegedly) “Religious”
Symbols and Their Applicability Today
Emily Fitch ............................................................................. ...431
This Comment examines the heavily-discussed topic of the establishment clause of the First Amendment, and explores how the clause
relates to the public display of religious symbols. This Article
discusses the four Establishment Clause tests: the Lemon Test
from Lemon v. Kurtzman; the Endorsement Test from Lynch v.
Donnelly; the Coercion Test from Allegheny County v. Greater
Pittsburgh ACLU; and the Van Orden Test from Van Orden v.
Perry. This Comment analyzes each of the four tests to determine
which test is best suited to evaluate the constitutionality of the public
display of a religious symbol.

“Passing the Trash” in Illinois After Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit
District No. 5: A Proposal for Legislation to Prevent School Districts
From Handing Off Sexually Abusive Employees to Other School
Districts
Noah Menold................................................................................. ...473
In school districts throughout the United States, school administrations often conceal employee-on-student sexual misconduct and
allow the perpetrators to resign and continue their abuse of students
at other school districts. The practice is known as “passing the
trash.” In Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit District No. 5, the Illinois
Supreme Court addressed a case of “passing the trash” and held

iv

that a school district does not owe an affirmative duty to a subsequent school district employer or its students; however, the court
determined that a school district has a duty to provide accurate
information about former employees. In an effort to eradicate the
practice of “passing the trash,” the Illinois General Assembly
amended the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act.
This Comment argues that the narrow scope of Doe-3 v. McLean
County Unit District No. 5 does very little for victims of “passing the
trash.” In addition, this Comment argues that the Illinois General
Assembly’s use of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act
was the wrong mechanism to prevent the practice, as the Act only
works if school districts do not conceal employee-on-student sexual
misconduct and report such incidents. Finally, this Comment proposes alternative legislative methods of preventing “passing the
trash” by: (1) providing victims a civil cause of action against
violators of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act; (2)
requiring school districts to conduct more comprehensive background checks; (3) requiring school districts to verify that transient
school personnel remain in good standing; and (4) creating a
cohesive national policy.
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